There is a time when everything has already occurred. There is optimism everywhere, the economy is ostensibly normal; on wall street bankers are despised but rewarded. There is no lack of “conflicts of interest.” On the contrary, there are more and more conflicts of interest.
Nor has there been discussion on the repeal of the so-called “Glass-Steagall Act.”
Enacted in 1933 under the Roosevelt administration as part of regulatory reform in response to the Great Depression, the Glass-Steagall Act called for tough oversight over banking-investment institutions as well as full disclosure and prohibition of conflicts of interest via a disjoint – not shared in common - banking practice between commercial and investment banks.
The prohibition of conflicts of interest was particularly central to Glass-Steagall as it helped curb the loss of confidence in investors during economic downturns.
The following is my read on what would occur if we do not re-enact the Glass-Steagall Act – or some variation of it - as part of regulatory reform in the face of the recent financial crisis:
namely, chances for a depression will increase.
Depressions & Confidence
Some of you may have read Irving Fisher’s celebrated 1933 article , “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,” where Fisher defines a “depression” as the point at which the value of assets sinks below the value of debt on those assets.
As simplistic as that may sound – a debt is fixed unless a debtor can find relief . While the value of assets may vary according to investor “confidence.”
Now, “ a cup of confidence goes a long way, but a lack therein can destroy even the best among us ” – my father.
The restoration of confidence for instance was J.P. Morgan’s intention after the stock market crash of 1902- joining a bankers’ pool to invest in the stock market.
Franklin Roosevelt hypothesized on the Great Depression in similar terms. “The only thing we have to fear, ” he declared in his first inaugural address in 1933, “is fear itself.” In fact, there is exists a strong-positive correlation between business downturns and loss of confidence from time-inception of our great republic.
John Maynard Keynes was among the first to adopt into his economic theory the notion of confidence. Incidentally, it was originally proposed by Richard Kahn as a sort of feedback system (I won’t bore you with details). More recently, Shiller and Akerlof propose a corollary concept , which they call the confidence multiplier (Animal Spirits).
The so-called multiplier – which should be viewed in terms of rounds with the initial round belonging to the government stimulus - limits each dollar spent in the stimulus as a fraction of income for some people, which they then spend. That fraction is called the marginal propensity to consume (MPC).
Here is the gist.
Any initial government stimulus puts money into people’s hands, which they then spend.
The second round belongs to the people. Their investment in turn generates income for yet more people in an amount equal to the MPC dollars. The sum of all these rounds may be represented by the formula $1 + $MPC + $MPC^2 + $MPC^3 + $MPC^4 + … For those wondering the sum is not infinite. It is in fact 1/(1 – MPC), called the Keynesian multiplier.
If, for example, $MPC = $0.75, then $1 /$0.25 = $4.
Note: the usual (easily measured) way to think of economic multipliers is by way of expenditure, consumption, or investment.
The notion of confidence, on the other hand, isn’t so easily measurable.
Is it enough, for instance, to simply declare confidence in order to be in fact measured as confident?
How is confidence measured so as to avoid its subjective stance?
Is consumer confidence as measured by the Conference Board a sufficient matrix?
As you could imagine, it becomes increasingly complex when dealing with human emotions such as the feeling of confidence.
Shiller and Akerlof propose the following: let the set of multipliers – which include consumption, investment , and, government expenditure - also contain the confidence multiplier.
Further, let the confidence multiplier be an extension (equal in set) to the consumption multiplier – as resulting from different rounds of expenditure. Then any change in confidence implies change in income and confidence in the next round, where each change affects income and confidence in successive rounds.
Why does confidence matter?
The depression of the 1890s was largely associated with a crash of confidence – associated with remembered stories of economic failure, including stories of increased corruption in the years that preceded the depression.
In Irrational Exuberance it was shown that person-to-person contagion of thought spurred by an initial stock market price increase can lead to the amplification of optimistic new era stories ( Akerlof and Shiller). The investor excitement [confidence] itself propagate such stories.
The Great Depression – as has been inferred from work by Barry Eichengreen and Jeffery Sachs - spread from one country to the next through the collapse of the gold standard.
With a worldwide loss of confidence in the currency, central banks could defend the gold standard only by substantially raising interest rates, thereby squelching their own economies.
As is imagined confidence-optimism play a central roll in economics. How much confidence exists if our lender is also our wealth manager?
But that is exactly the result with the repeal of Glass-Steagall.
Leave it to political hacks to propose an outright repeal in 1999 – under the Clinton administration.
The repeal enabled commercial lenders such as Citigroup, which may in fact be the largest U.S. bank, to underwrite and trade instruments such as “mortgage-backed securities” and “collateralized debt obligations. ” The removal of Glass-Steagall in both the U.S. and U.K. was integral to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09 – Elizabeth Warren , one of five outside experts who constitute the Congressional Oversight Panel of the Troubled Asset Relief Program ( TARP), Telegraph.co.uk.
History
Contrived to prevent a repeat of the 1920s’ quick profit-swindle, in which banks made speculative investments to their own detriment and to society at large , Glass-Steagall required commercial banks to be tightly supervised – further, gain access to federal deposit insurance-savings. This would have prevented – as well it did - runs on banks. Investment banks, on the other hand, weren’t government guaranteed – free to engage in more speculative transactions for the prospective investor.
The New Deal also acted on the home mortgage front.
During the Great Depression millions were loosing their homes and farms to foreclosure. In response, the Roosevelt administration proposed and created the modern era of home finance. Before the New Deal, mortgages were typically issued as short-term notes, where most of the principle was due and payable at the end of a brief term – often just three to five years. Can you imagine home ownership under terms just 1/6 on what most notes are held today?
Congress in turn created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to insure these mortgages and – yes – win their confidence among lenders.
As you could imagine, the system worked like a charm – combining sound lending standards with expanded opportunity. The rate of home ownership rose from 44% in the late 1940s to 64% by the mid – 1960s . Savings and loan associations almost always ran in the black, there were no serious scandals or loss in confidence and the government deposit insurance funds regularly returned a profit.
This is much more than one can be said of banks today.
Despite the steep yield curve – the relation between the interest rate (or cost of borrowing) and the time to maturity of the debt for a given borrower in a given currency.
The banks are now borrowing at 0-.25% points and charging borrowers several percentage points.
In the 1980s, under the Reagan administration, legislators in the name of free-market capitalism began to make exceptions to Glass-steagall.
For example, ”Regulation Q, ” which allowed the Federal Reserve to regulate interest rates in savings accounts – repealed by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. To add insult to injury, in 1999 uder the Clinton administration, Congress repealed the Act outright – the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act - permitting financial supermarkets such as Citigroup to operate any kind of financial business imaginable without regard to the notion of conflict of interest.
The ideal classical economists’ dream if I may say: the efficacy to profit from multiple conflicts of interest.
The dot-com bubble of the late 1990s and the so-called Enron scandal not to mention the subsequent market crash - from which the Nasdaq is yet to recover – were the result of the SEC and bank regulators not able to police conflicts of interest. By the year 2000 , much of the remainder protective apparatus was repealed.
Now
Fast forward to 2007-09.
For decades, real estate prices have appreciated faster than incomes – surprisingly – given a house is worth at most – or at least should be – what some buyer can afford to pay and not what a buyer is willing to pay.
Yet, housing prices continued to appreciate artificially – motivated by historically low rates and extended credit to those with questionable credit. Mortgage companies relying not only on speculative investment strategies but also on the false premise that prices shall appreciate year-over-year add infinitum.
A confident bunch but confidence misplaced.
“Stirctly-free market economics leads to chaos!”
As an investor, what do you need beyond the usual terms of money and/or vision?
Full disclosure and avoidance of conflicts of interest.
Glass-Steagall called just for that.
It was based on the pillars of disclosure and outright prohibition of inherent conflicts of interest.
Namely, all publicly traded-listed companies were required to disclose to the Securities of Exhange Commission (SEC) and to the public at large of financial information deemed “material” to investor decisions. The New Deal which contained Glass-Steagall also prohibited stock trading based on insider information not to mention promote barriers -structural – against the types of temptations that destroyed the economy in the 1920s.
But, I digress.
Glass-Steagall sought to prohibit a single financial institution from being both a commercial bank and an investment bank – as is – Citigroup Inc.
Through its operating units - Citicorp and Citi Holdings - Citigroup provides consumers, corporations, governments and institutions with a range of products and services, including consumer banking and credit, corporate and investment banking , and, of course, wealth management.
Citigroup Inc. might as well be renamed: “Interests holding in Conflict.”
You decide.
Many thanks to deregulation , the entire field operated largely beyond the purview of traditional bank examiners. The so-called shadow banking system - comprised of non-bank financial institutions lending money – played a critical role in sub-prime mortgage lending - corallary to deregulation.
Once the housing market turned soft – as inevitable as it would have seem – mortgages began to fail, and of course investors with one choice and no confidence headed to the exits. The stocks of mortgage companies plummeted – for instance Countrywide ; banks underwriting these loans followed suit; hedge funds holding their bonds lost Billions – so on and so forth not unlike a house of cards.
Thanks to deregulation – the repeal of Glass-Steagall – confidence multipliers were largely absent.
But, why should government stimulus be necessary?
More importantly, is confidence in government possible if government isn’t lender of last resort?
Would you for instance invest in a Certificate of Deposit if not for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) – a government entity?
Without the FDIC - hence its extended coefficients -there is no investor confidence in banks.
Without investor confidence – be it in banks or otherwise - there is no investment.
With no investment there is no growth.
Plain and simple.
With no growth, there is only one outcome: namely, depression.
Razmik B. Ekmekdjian
author/managing director
[Via http://judiciouso.wordpress.com]